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I. INTRODUCTION
The changing legal relationship between students and their college
or university reflects the evolution of higher education in this country.
During the Colonial period and the early years of the Republic, higher
education was conducted mainly through small, church-affiliated col-
leges.1 In most cases, the founders and faculties of early American
1. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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schools imitated the collegiate systems of Oxford and Cambridge.2 Stu-
dents and their teachers aspired to withdraw from the world of every-
day affairs to live and work in an environment that mirrored the
families students left behind. Faculties were concerned not only with
intellectual advancement but also with the development of sound moral
character, classical virtue, and conventional religious sensibility. Insti-
tutions of higher learning were exclusive, intimate, and religious.
Whatever the institutional rhetoric, the driving force behind American
schools was collegiality.-
The dominant legal philosophy courts used to describe this familial
relationship was the doctrine of in loco parentis.4 College authorities
stood in the place of parents to the students entrusted to their care.
5
Courts were loathe to interfere with college authorities in either aca-
demic or disciplinary matters.6 Students with nonacademic grievances
had little chance of successfully petitioning the courts for redress.
In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, academia's under-
standing of itself underwent a dramatic transformation. Under the in-
fluence, of Johns Hopkins, Chicago, and Harvard, many prominent
colleges aspired toward university status. Germany replaced England as
the principal model for American schools.1 Yet the traditional legal in-
terpretation of the student-university relationship remained relatively
constant as courts continued to defer to almost every expression of in-
stitutional authority."
The widespread student protests of the 1960s forced courts to rec-
ognize the fundamental changes in educational philosophy and campus
life that made in loco parentis an outdated concept.' Many courts ac-
knowledged the new nature of the student-university relationship and
struggled for ways to characterize these changes. Contract and constitu-
tional law became useful tools for the student litigant. By the 1990s
2. Id.
3. The collegiate way of life
is the notion that a curriculum, a library, a faculty, and students are not enough to make a
college. It is an adherence to the residential scheme of things. It is respectful of quiet rural
settings, dependant on dormitories, committed to dining halls, permeated by paternalism. It
is what every American college has had or consciously rejected or lost or sought to recapture.
F. RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY: A HIsTORY 87 (1962).
4. In loco parentis means literally "in the place of a parent."
5. The very young age, by modem standards, of college students in the nineteenth century
made this concept understandable. In 1826 two-thirds of Yale College's freshman class was 16
years of age and younger. J. McLAcHLAN, AMERICAN BOARDING SCHOOLs: A HISTORICAL STUDY 181
(1970).
6. See infra notes 61-66, 84-102, and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 61-66, 84-102, and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
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courts and legal authorities unequivocally proclaimed the death of in
loco parentis.10
But to what extent was the death of in loco parentis more style
than substance? Despite repeated judicial assurances that in loco
parentis was doctrinally inadequate, student litigants still rarely prevail
in suits against universities.11 The new contractual and constitutional
analysis applied to student-university disputes 12 is problematic. The
state action doctrine, usually applied to public institutions, cannot be
employed in a private context. 3 The continuing debate over hate
speech rules on American campuses further illustrates an institutional
reluctance to relinquish rigid parental control. 4 In sum, the legal doc-
trine of in loco parentis continues to influence the legal status and in-
ternal policies of many modern American multiversities.15
This Note surveys the history of the American ideal of higher edu-
cation, its evolution in the courts, and recent indications that in loco
10. See, e.g., Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968) (noting that in loco
parentis is "no longer tenable in a university community"); Zirkel & Reichner, Is the In Loco
Parentis Doctrine Dead?, 15 J.L. & EDuc. 271, 281-82 (1986) (examining the "complete demise" of
the doctrine in the college context); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DEN.
L.J. 582, 591 (1968) (asserting that "we need not be surprised nor alarmed that [in loco parentis] is
now being discarded"); Note, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and the Student-
College Relationship, 65 IND. LJ. 471, 474 (1990) (arguing that the doctrine has been "rendered
inoperative"); Note, Toward Contractual Rights for College Students, 10 J.L. & EDUC. 163, 166
(1981) ("[i]n the fact [sic] of the changing character of higher education, the theory has lost its
support") [hereinafter Note, Toward Contractual Rights]. But see Szablewicz & Gibbs, Colleges'
Increasing Exposure to Liability: The New In Loco Parentis, 16 J.L. & EDUC. 453 (1987) (claiming
that in loco parentis is being revived in the area of tort liability).
11. See infra notes 133-56 and accompanying text.
12. For purposes of this Note, unless otherwise specified, student-university disputes refers
to disputes involving disciplinary actions, financial arrangements, or other nonacademic matters.
Whether courts should intervene in purely academic disputes is not addressed in this Note. Courts
are even more reluctant to adjudicate what they perceive to be academic disputes. See, e.g., Board
of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 90 (1978) (stating that academic dismissal
"requires an expert evaluation. . . and is not readily adapted" to judicial review); Regents of the
Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985) (stating that courts "should show great respect
for the faculty's professional judgment"); Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D.
Ga. 1977) (noting the "traditional rule of nonintervention in academic matters"). But see Buss,
Easy Cases Make Bad Law: Academic Expulsion and the Uncertain Law of Procedural Due Pro-
cess, 65 IowA L. REv. 1, 99 (1979) (arguing that Horowitz did in fact involve regulation of conduct
as well as academic standards).
13. See infra notes 144-56 and accompanying text.
14. In many cases, the same people who once advocated expanding student rights now argue
that the preservation of collegiality and campus harmony demands restrictions on student speech.
See infra notes 157-86 and accompanying text.
15. This Note does not address the in loco parentis doctrine as applied to elementary and
secondary school students. For a discussion of this area of the law, see Zirkel & Reichner, supra
note 10, at 273-81.
The term "multiversity" is used in this Note to describe those institutions that are true uni-
versities in the European sense. While no rigid criteria exist, multiversities generally are large
institutions composed of numerous undergraduate, graduate, and professional schools.
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parentis is not dead. Part II surveys the development of higher educa-
tion in America, focusing on the struggle between the English and Ger-
man models. Part III examines the doctrine of in loco parentis and its
development in the American courts. Part IV discusses twentieth cen-
tury inroads on in loco parentis. Part V demonstrates that in loco
parentis remains a significant force in shaping American law and edu-
cational philosophy. Finally, Part VI offers a proposal for redefining the
student-university relationship to conform with the evolution of higher
education in America.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND1 '
Much of the legal confusion apparent in student-university dis-
putes stems from the judiciary's failure to appreciate the history of
American higher education. Following the Civil War, the stage was set
for a confrontation between the two competing educational philosophies
in this country. Early American colleges emulated English residential
colleges.1 By the late nineteenth century, however, many institutions
began to follow the example of the German universities.18 Any under-
standing of the student-university relationship must take into account
these conflicting models that continue to divide American higher
education.
A. The English Collegiate Ideal
1. The Colonial and Early American College
The founders of the earliest American collegess explicitly invoked
the medieval English universities as their models and inspirations. 0
Harvard's earliest statutes derived directly from those at Cambridge.
The first Harvard degrees, for example, were granted pro modo
16. Part II of this Note is merely a brief survey of certain trends in American educational
history that are relevant to the legal issues at hand. An historical understanding is necessary in
approaching this subject. Law is in part a reflection of social institutions, and the law in this area
cannot be understood without reference to specific historical developments. The work of the his-
torians cited should be consulted for a more comprehensive discussion.
17. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
19. Nine colleges founded before 1770 survive: Harvard, William and Mary, Yale, New Jersey
(now Princeton University), King's (now Columbia University), Philadelphia (now the University
of Pennsylvania), Rhode Island (now Brown University), Queen's (now Rutgers University), and
Dartmouth. See F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 3.
20. See J. BRUBACHER & W. RUDY, HIGHER EDUCATION IN TRANSITION 3 (3d ed. 1976). The
influence of the English model on American schools, however, should not be exaggerated. The
unique circumstances of the American context resulted in many differences, although the basic
character and principles of residential life were the same. G. SCHMIDT, THE LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGE
21 (1957).
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Academiarum in Anglia.21 The most influential Harvard founders were
Cambridge graduates who brought to colonial Massachusetts a dis-
tinctly Puritan educational ideal fostered at Emmanuel College in Eng-
land.22 These direct connections with English universities ensured that
American education was modeled after the English system and its pecu-
liar values.
The earliest American colleges explicitly promoted religious values
and virtuous moral behavior among their students.2 Although most
American schools did not restrict admissions to members of a particular
religious sect, few questioned the fundamentally religious goals of
higher education. Harvard's founders sought to produce well-educated-
clergy and laymen with sufficient learning to practice their faith intelli-
gently.24 The College of William and Mary in Virginia also subscribed
to religious values,25 although the. nature of Anglicanism in Virginia
contributed to a somewhat more secular approach.2 6 The earliest Amer-
ican colleges, whether located in Virginia or Massachusetts, sought to
ensure that their communities maintained a common religious faith and
system of moral values. The college was not only an institution where
students learned Greek and Latin but also was a place where the
faculty nurtured in them the local version of orthodox Christianity.
The English origins of American colleges exerted a practical as well
as a philosophical influence. The curriculum of early colleges was tradi-
tional in that Greek and Latin exercises formed the core of study. The
English viewed a college as more than a collection of individuals en-
gaged in separate intellectual pursuits.2 The college was instead an al-
21. The literal translation of this phrase is "according to the manner of universities in Eng-
land." J. BRUBACHER & W. RUDY, supra note 20, at 3.
22. F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 24. "The founders of Harvard attempted to re-create at
Cambridge the college they had known at the old Cambridge in England." Id. David Hackett
Fischer conducted a fascinating examination of the English origins of American settlers that un-
derscores Cambridge's position as the "Mother of Harvaid." See D. FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED 39
(1989) (showing that half of a group of university-trained immigrants to Massachusetts attended
three Cambridge colleges and 30% attended Emmanuel). Appropriately, John Harvard himself was
a matriculant of Emmanuel College. Id. at 42.
23. Harvard's earliest statement of purpose expressed hope that "[e]very one shall consider
the mayne End of his life and studyes, to know God and Jesus Christ, which is Eternall life." J.
BRUBACHER & W. RUDY, supra note 20, at 8.
24. Id. at 6.
25. The founders of William and Mary attempted to operate the school in such a way that
"the youth . . . [were] piously trained in good letters and manners." Id. at 7.
26. See F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 7. When compared with their Puritan brethren, Virgini-
ans appeared substantially less concerned with religious piety. One visitor to Westmoreland
County, Virginia, in 1715 observed that every man at a church service was smoking a pipe. 0.
HANDLIN & L. HANDLIN, LIBERTY AND POWER 117 (1986).
27. F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 24-25.
28. The colonists also imported the English system of collegiate life, which was different
from that of European institutions. Because the European universities included graduate and pro-
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most organic entity, a large family in which the intimate nature of
residential life demanded strict authority and control."' The English
model fostered absolute institutional control of students by faculty both
inside and outside the classroom. At all the early American schools, stu-
dents lived and worked under a vast array of rules and restrictions.3
This one-sided relationship between the student and the college mir-
rored the situation at English schools where the emphasis on hierarchi-
cal authority stemmed from medieval Christian theology and the
unique legal privileges afforded the university corporation.'
2. The Antebellum College
Although the paternalistic view of colleges predominated in the
early nineteenth century, some educators began to question the English
approach.32 The University of Virginia was one of the earliest schools to
fessional schools, the faculty were not concerned with outside student activities. Students con-
ducted their own affairs through formal student governments. See J. BRUBACHER & W. RUDY, supra
note 20, at 5.
Traditionally, all students at German universities were mandatorily members of the student
body, or Studentenschaft, of their university. Geck, Student Power in West Germany, 17 AM. J.
Comp. L. 337, 345 (1969). In most cases, the Studentenschaft was a legal entity with an indepen-
dent role in the university community. Id. See also Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two
Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 Tax. L. REV. 1265, 1270 (1988) (stating that
"[t]he German university confronted its student body primarily as a purveyor of knowledge and as
a credentializing agency, not as a parent surrogate").
29. See F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 88. In upholding the English ideal, President Smith of
Dartmouth asserted that "[e]arnest young men crave real guidance .... They welcome, too, a
proper system of compulsion and restraint." Letter from President Smith of Dartmouth to Presi-
dent McCosh of Princeton (1873), quoted in F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 88.
30. The paternalism was so pervasive that it occasionally bordered on the ludicrous. The
president of the University of Georgia, for example, routinely would sweep Athens with binoculars
searching for signs of disobedient students. Also, the faculties did not hesitate to use corporal
punishment on students in their care. At Harvard flogging continued until 1718, while boxing was
not eliminated until 1755. According to one critic, the colleges engaged in a "[mlinute regulation of
conduct that was not peculiarly Puritan as much as it was peculiarly collegiate, breathing not the
free spirit of adult scholarly inquiry but the atmosphere of a boarding school for small boys." Id. at
27. As this comment indicates, Professor Rudolph sharply criticizes the nineteenth century col-
legiate ideal. His history, while thorough and readable, is imbued with an intractably Whiggish
understanding of American education. In Professor Rudolph's view, every schoolboy knows that
the modern American system of education is the best system, and its history is mostly the chroni-
cle of the near-mystical evolution of that ideal. This understanding colors Professor Rudolph's
approach to his subject, and the critical reader would do well to question his appraisal of the
collegiate ideal as an antediluvian absurdity.
31. In medieval times "[t]he university was largely an autonomous corporation whose mem-
bers were free from most, if not all, of the usual civil regulations and laws. . . .By accepting the
authority of the university. . ., the student accepted a position in which obedience to the univer-
sity hierarchy was required." M. Ross, THE UNwvRsiTy: THE ANATOMY OF ACADEME 69 (1976). The
medieval student's surrender of personal autonomy may be viewed as a quid pro quo exchange. In
return for protection from civil authority, the student agreed to submit to university discipline.
This idea continues to influence student-university legal theory.
32. See J. BRUBACHER & W. RUDY, supra note 20, at 100-04; F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 90-
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move away from the English model.3 George Ticknor, one of the first
Americans to study in Germany, returned to teach at Harvard in 1819
and unsuccessfully pressed for major reform.3 4 Likewise, Phillip Linds-
ley, president of the University of Nashville, ambitiously attempted to
reshape American education in the 1820s.' 5
These early reform efforts met with little success. A series of riots
at Virginia threatened to close the school soon after its founding.3 The
University of Nashville failed when President Lindsley was unable to
muster sufficient financial support."7 Moreover, traditionalist academics
soon responded to the challenge of the reformers with a manifesto of
their own. In 1828 Yale College answered the reform proposals with a
report" advocating continued adherence to the collegiate ideal." The
Yale report firmly rejected the suggestion that American institutions
model themselves after German schools.4" Widely applauded by other
schools, the Yale report became the rallying cry for educational tradi-
tionalists who were increasingly alarmed by the prospects for major
reform.41
B. The University Comes to America
Widespread reform of American higher education did not take
place until after the Civil War. An increasingly industrialized society
forced colleges to respond to the demand for technically specialized
workers.42 Once again, reformers looked to the German model when
they founded Johns Hopkins in 1876.43 Johns Hopkins's German-edu-
cated faculty emphasized research and specialized knowledge rather
than leisurely academic pursuits and Christian moral values." The
33. Virginia's charter stressed student autonomy and self-responsibility, a radical innovation
for the time. See J. BRUBACHER & W. RUDY, supra note 20, at 101.
34. See F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 118.
35. President Lindsley hoped to reform the fledgling school based on German principles,
which emphasized scholastic endeavor over collegiate life. He also attempted to implement a prac-
tical curriculum designed to suit the needs of the growing nation. See id. at 116-17.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Original Papers in Relation to a Course of Liberal Education, 25 AM. J. Sc. & ARTS 297-
351 (1829) [hereinafter Original Papers].
39. See F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 130-31.
40. See id. at 133. "We hope at least, that this college may be spared the mortification of a
ludicrous attempt to imitate . . . [the German universities], while it is unprovided with the re-
sources necessary to execute the purpose." Original Papers, supra note 38, at 312, quoted in F.
RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 133.
41. See F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 135.
42. J. BRUBACHER & W. RUDY, supra note 20, at 177.
43. Id. at 178-82.
44. See id. at 178.
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school's students were remarkably free of paternalistic control, the cur-
riculum was mostly elective, and students generally were un-
supervised.45 By the 1880s a number of eastern colleges began the
transition from college to university.46
In the early years of the twentieth century, most American colleges
hastened to follow the lead of the university reformers.47 Newly created
state colleges in particular embraced the German model and strived for
growth to support increasingly specialized research.4" Only a few insti-
tutions avoided the rush to enlarge. This small but influential group of
liberal arts colleges continued to stress undergraduate intimacy over the
rewards of multiversity status.49 The larger research universities usually
attempted to maintain a core college operating under English
precepts. 50 As the schools grew in size and the student bodies became
increasingly heterogeneous, however, maintenance of such intimacy be-
came difficult.5 1 The English ideal was based on the cohesiveness of a
small community. Thus, the social unity of university communities
tended to diminish as their size increased. The influx of older veterans
after World War II highlighted the tension between an antiquated dis-
ciplinary system and the new developments in American education.2
This tension between nineteenth century discipline and the compo-
sition of the modern multiversity culminated in the student protests of
45. Id. at 180.
46. Other new schools aspired to university status from their formation. The University of
Chicago, founded in 1889, was the most prominent of these schools. Like Johns Hopkins, Chicago
emphasized innovative academic research over intimate faculty-student interaction. Id. at 179-84.
More than 8000 Americans pursued graduate studies in Germany between 1870 and 1900. Often
they returned eager to enlighten American institutions with the superiority of German ways. See
Metzger, supra note 28, at 1269.
47. F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 329-34. A comment by Professor John W. Burgess of Co-
lumbia University aptly illustrates the zeal to expand: "I confess that I am unable to divine what is
to be ultimately the position of Colleges which cannot become Universities and which will not be
Gymnasia. I cannot see what reason they will have to exist. It will be largely a waste of capital to
maintain them, and largely a waste of time to attend them." Id. at 330.
48. See id. at 332-33.
49. Id. at 448-49. These schools continued to espouse the Renaissance ideal of wholly edu-
cated men and a leisurely period of study. Id. at 448.
50. This fact leads commentators to declare that, in spite of the Germanic influence, the
collegiate ideal remained the central philosophy of American education. See, e.g., Metzger, supra
note 28, at 1272 (stating that residential colleges "survived the rise of the graduate school and
reigned supreme"). While collegiate values enjoyed a renaissance during the early and middle years
of the twentieth century, American institutions irrevocably committed themselves to the multiver-
sity ideal. The "college life" movement was largely a student phenomenon, as the proliferation of
fraternities, literary societies, and secret societies indicates. See H. HOROWITZ, CAMPUS LIFF 11-14
(1987). The promotion of the English ideal in these organizations is not a sign that Germanization
failed. Rather, it indicates that it succeeded so well that students were forced to create their own
intimate communities.
51. See H. HoRowrrz, supra note 50, at 71-73.
52. See J. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 486.
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the 1960s. After World War II, increased enrollment and student diver-
sity made it difficult to operate a collegiate system premised on homo-
geneity." Confrontation between diverse student bodies and the
disciplinary strictures of an earlier era perhaps was inevitable. A major
clash occurred in 1964 when the University of California attempted to
prevent students from using the campus for political or social pro-
tests.5 4 Angry students responded with the Free Speech Movement,
which culminated in mass demonstrations and hundreds of arrests.5
The Free Speech Movement was only one in a series of campus protests
that racked American campuses for several years s.5 The widespread dis-
content was a clear sign that the philosophy of in loco parentis was no
longer tenable in the multiversities dominating American education.
The student protests of the 1960s sealed the fate of traditional col-
legiate values at most American institutions. By the late twentieth cen-
tury, those schools that continued to espouse the educational
philosophy of an earlier era were a distinct minority.57 Although some
universities attempted to maintain strict scrutiny of student behavior
through the creation of vast student life bureaucracies, 8 the heyday of
paternalism was over. In 1852 John Cardinal Newman wrote that "a
university is, according to the usual design, properly an Alma Mater,
knowing her children one by one, and not a foundry, or a mint, or a
treadmill. ' '59 In 1971 the American Bar Association acknowledged the
new reality: "Most of our institutions have become far too large and
53. See Reidhaar, The Assault on the Citadel: Reflections on a Quarter Century of Change
in the Relationships Between the Student and the University, 12 J.C. & U.L. 343, 347 (1985).
54. Id. at 349.
55. Id. at 350. Many of the leaders of the revolt at Berkeley had spent their summer working
as civil rights activists in the South. See H. Hoaowrrz, supra note 50, at 231. They returned to
campus unwilling to accept restrictions on their own political rights. See id.
56. As a result of these protests, a number of academic organizations strongly reaffirmed the
principle of free speech on American campuses. See JOINT STATEMENT ON THE RIGHTS AND FREE-
DOMS OF STUDENTS, reprinted in STUDENT PROTEST AND THE LAW 213 (G. Holmes ed. 1969). The
statement, which was drafted by the American Association of University Professors, the U.S. Na-
tional Student Association, the Association of American Colleges, and others, asserted that
"[s]tudents and student organizations should be free to examine and discuss all questions of inter-
est to them, and to express opinions publicly and privately." Id. at 218. The statement was an
attempt to quell the increasingly violent nature of the student protests. See H. HOROWITz, supra
note 50, at 221. The widespread arrests by noncampus authorities underscores the failure of in loco
parentis on modem campuses. While in earlier times, colleges provided students protection from
civil authorities, supra note 31, the multiversity in the 1960s often was forced to rely on the state
to maintain any semblance of order on campus.
57. Approximately 800 liberal arts colleges continue to operate in the United States. G.
SCHMIDT, supra note 20, at viii.
58. See F. RUDOLPH, supra note 3, at 460.
59. J. NEWMAN, Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning, in THE IDEA OF A UNwERsrrY:
NINE LECTURES TO THE CATHOLICS OF DUBLIN § 8 (1852).
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impersonal to resemble a family in any important respects." 60
III. IN Loco PARENTIS AND AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION
Most courts readily accepted the early American view of colleges as
intimate and familial institutions. When students sought legal remedies
for school disputes, courts invoked the doctrine of in loco parentis to
justify their nonintervention." Just as children usually cannot sue their
parents, the courts ordinarily deprived students of redress in disputes
with their colleges. This legal doctrine survived well into the twentieth
century. By the time courts began to question the wisdom of in loco
parentis, radical changes in American education had made the doctrine
obsolete.
A. English Origins
In loco parentis first developed as an English tort principle used in
the resolution of tutor-pupil disputes.2 A tutor could raise the doctrine
as a defense to a charge of battery against a student." The parent dele-
gated part of his authority to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child. The
schoolmaster was then in loco parentis and had a partial share of pa-
rental power. Any necessary discipline could be employed by the surro-
gate parent.0 4 Thus, in its early stages the in loco parentis doctrine was
a delegation of authority designed for the special circumstances of the
tutor-pupil relationship. Later, however, in loco parentis became the
model for all college-student relationships. 5 The American courts even-
tually expanded the doctrine into a paradigmatic legal model for the
resolution of all student-university disputes.6
Although in loco parentis was perhaps the dominant doctrine ap-
plied to student disputes, the corporate status of universities afforded
60. ABA Committee on Civil Rights and Responsibilities, A Statement of the Rights and
Responsibilities of College and University Students, reprinted in Kessler, The Students, in LAW
AND DISCIPLINE ON CAMPUS 209 (G. Holmes ed. 1971).
61. See infra notes 84-102 and accompanying text.
62. See Van Alstyne, The Tentative Emergence of Student Power in the United States, 17
AM. J. CoMP. L. 403, 405-06 (1969).
63. Id. at 406.
64. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453 (1770).
65. Id.
66. See infra notes 84-102 and accompanying text. Seventeenth and eighteenth century writ-
ers often looked to the family as a model for the well-ordered community. In 1699 Cotton Mather
wrote: "There are Parents in the Common-Wealth, as well as in the Family; there are Parents in
the Church, and Parents in the School, as well as in the Common-Wealth." 0. HANDLIN & L.
HANDLIN, supra note 26, at 148 (emphasis in original). The courts of the period recognized broad
rights of parents to enforce their will on their offspring, even at a relatively advanced age. See id.
at 161-62.
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students some protection from summary discipline.6 7 Under this ap-
proach membership in the university corporation protected students
from arbitrary dismissal.68 The King v. Chancellor of the University of
Cambridge"9 is the principal English case employing the corporate doc-
trine. In Cambridge a student sought a writ of mandamus ° to compel
the university to nullify the suspension of his degree.1 The school ar-
gued that the courts should not interfere with the internal affairs of a
college created by an independent charter.7 Lord Pratt, however, held
that while the court would not interfere with strictly academic mat-
ters, 7 3 the student must be given an opportunity to be heard before be-
ing removed as a member of the university corporation.7 The fact that
the corporation involved was a university was not dispositive. Since the
case did not concern any specifically academic matters, ordinary corpo-
ration law provided the student some protection. 5
The approach of the Cambridge court offered students more pro-
tection than the in loco parentis doctrine.7 6 By requiring that students
be given an opportunity to be heard before dismissal, Cambridge antici-
pated the landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama,77 which extended proce-
dural due process protections to public university students.78 Since
mandamus could be used against private as well as public universities,
the range of student protection was even greater. Unfortunately, only a
handful of American courts adopted the mandamus approach to compel
universities to grant degrees 9 or reinstate students.8 0 At least one court
67. See, e.g., The King v. Chancellor of the Univ. of Cambridge, 2 Ld. Raym. 1334, 92 Eng.
Rep. 370 (K.B. 1723).
68. See, e.g., id. at 1348, 92 Eng. Rep. at 378; Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa.
C. 77, 84 (1877).
69. Cambridge, 2 Ld. Raym. 1334, 92 Eng. Rep. 370.
70. A writ of mandamus is an "extraordinary writ which lies to compel performance of a
ministerial act or a mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right in the plaintiff, a correspond-
ing duty in the defendant, and a want of any other appropriate and adequate remedy." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) (citing Cohen v. Ford, 19 Pa. Commw. 417, 422, 339 A.2d 175, 177
(1975)).
71. The school had suspended the student's degree for nonpayment of a debt. Cambridge, 2
Ld. Raym. at 1334, 1336, 92 Eng. Rep. at 370, 371.
72. The college argued that with "this privilege of suspending degrees. . . it was necessary,
that universities should have a summary method of proceeding." Id. at 1347, 92 Eng. Rep. at 377.
73. Id. at 1348, 92 Eng. Rep. at 378.
74. Id. at 1347, 92 Eng. Rep. at 378.
75. See id. at 1347, 92 Eng. Rep. at 378.
76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
77. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
78. See infra subpart IV(B)(1).
79. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. People ex rel. Cooper, 123 Ill. 227, 13
N.E. 201 (1887).
80. See, e.g., Baltimore Univ. v. Colton, 98 Md. 623, 57 A. 14 (1904). A mandamus occasion-
ally is issued to compel a university to comply with the requirements of due process. See, e.g.,
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explicitly referred to Cambridge and used the same rationale to grant
students relief."1 The use of mandamus against educational institutions,
however, provoked such a hostile response from some legal authorities 2
that the practice was abandoned. In 1911 Dean Oliver Harker argued
that judicial intervention in such matters was an inappropriate interfer-
ence with the discretionary powers of universities.8 Most American
courts seemed to agree and viewed in loco parentis as a justification for
nonintervention.
B. In Loco Parentis and the American Courts
Although Gott v. Berea College8 4 was not the first American case to
articulate the basic principles of in loco parentis,5 the opinion often is
cited as the clearest expression of that doctrine in this country." The
case was procedurally unusual. The plaintiff was not a student seeking
relief from a disciplinary action by the college. Rather, the owner of a
restaurant near the campus sued the school for forbidding students to
patronize his business.8 7 The Kentucky Supreme Court dismissed the
claim on several grounds, but much of the opinion examines the right of
colleges to regulate the behavior of their students.8 The court held that
college authorities stand in loco parentis when the physical, moral, and
mental welfare of the pupils is concerned. 9 Any rule or regulation for
the betterment of their pupils in these areas was deemed permissible.90
In an environment composed of a small number of extremely young stu-
Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
81. Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. McCauley, 3 Pa. C. 77, 84 (1887). For a discussion of the
influence of Cambridge on the Hill case, see Fowler, The Legal Relationship Between the Ameri-
can College Student and the College: An Historical Perspective and the Renewal of a Proposal,
13 J.L. & EDUC. 401, 402-03 (1984).
82. See, e.g., Harker, The Use of Mandamus to Compel Educational Institutions to Confer
Degrees, 20 YALE L.J. 341 (1911).
83. Dean Harker believed that universities had the power "to regulate the conduct of stu-
dents as to study, recreation ... social enjoyment ... and general conduct." Id. at 351. In his
opinion, "[universities] know more about such matters than the courts or anyone else. Their habits
of thought, study, and life better fit them for the exercise of correct judgment than others, and,
except in clear cases of abuse of discretion, courts should keep their hands off." Id. at 352.
84. 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
85. See, e.g., People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton College, 40 Ill. 186, 187 (1866) ("A discretionary
power has been given.., and.. . we have no more authority to interfere than we have to control
the domestic discipline of a father in his family"). But see Commonwealth ex rel. Hill v. Mc-
Cauley, 3 Pa. C. 77 (1887) (rejecting an in loco parentis argument).
86. See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 81, at 408.
87. 156 Ky. at 378-79, 161 S.W. at 205. The plaintiff sought $2000 in damages for conspiracy
to injure his business and slanderous remarks made by college officials. Id. The college pleaded its
right to govern internal affairs as an affirmative defense. Id. at 378, 161 S.W. at 206.
88. Id. at 379-82, 161 S.W. at 206-09.
89. Id. at 379, 161 S.W. at 206.
90. Id.
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dents, college authorities were permitted to deny students the auton-
omy and rights enjoyed by others in order to preserve institutional
harmony.9 1 The breadth of the Berea College decision-"any rule or
regulation"-exemplifies the extreme deference afforded colleges under
the in loco parentis doctrine.
Although the Berea College decision offered little hope that courts
would interfere with the exercise of institutional authority, the court
did allude to some possibilities for the expansion of student rights. The
court noted that the rules would be "viewed somewhat more critically"
if Berea were a public, instead of a private, institution.92 The court also
acknowledged the existence of a contract that defined the student-uni-
versity relationship.93 Finally, the court recognized that public policy
might justify judicial intervention in certain situations. 4
Other courts were willing to uphold university authority in almost
any disciplinary action.9 5 In Stetson University v. Hunt9" the Supreme
Court of Florida ruled against a student who allegedly was expelled
without cause and in bad faith.9 7 The court quoted Berea College in
upholding the expulsion, which was based on a college rule prohibiting
offensive habits that intrude on others.9 8 Even though the court ac-
knowledged the student-university contractual relationship, this condi-
tion seemed to burden only the student's side of the bargain.9 9 Despite
the extreme breadth and vagueness of the rule, and the lack of any pro-
cedural protections, the court found that in loco parentis prohibited
judicial second-guessing of the college authorities unless they had acted
in a patently unreasonable manner.1°°
The use of in loco parentis amounted to blanket judicial approval
for all disciplinary actions against students. Some opinions invoking in
91. See id. at 381-82, 161 S.W. at 207-08 (quoting Wheaton, 40 Ill. at 187-88).
92. 156 Ky. at 380, 161 S.W. at 206.
93. The court stated: "A college or university may prescribe requirements for admission and
rules for the conduct of its students, and one who enters as a student impliedly agrees to conform
to such rules of government." Id.
94. Courts are not to interfere with college rulemaking "unless the rules and aims are un-
lawful or against public policy." Id. at 379, 161 S.W. at 206. This statement anticipated future
constitutional rulings. See infra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
95. See, e.g., Woods v. Simpson, 146 Md. 547, 551, 126 A. 882, 883 (1924) (stating that
college officers "must, of necessity, be left untrammeled in handling the problems which arise, as
their judgment and discretion may dictate"); Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich.
95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909); Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 278 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923).
96. 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924).
97. Id. at 513, 102 So. at 639.
98. Id. at 516, 102 So. at 640. The rule prohibited "[o]ffensive habits that interfere with the
comforts of others, or that retard the pupil's work, etc." This rule resembles modern hate speech
rules discussed infra at notes 157-86 and accompanying text.
99. See Hunt, 88 Fla. at 517, 102 So. at 640.
100. Id.
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loco parentis referred to contract law and contained premonitions of
more balanced alternatives."' Most courts, however, remained hostile
to the student litigant. Any rule or regulation, however broad, was en-
forced.102 More important, the courts were unwilling to question a uni-
versity's determination that the student was guilty of violating the rule
at issue. Students enjoyed virtually no protection from either vague and
intrusive rules or inadequate procedural safeguards. The parental rela-
tionship between schools and their students amounted to absolute au-
thoritarian control.
IV. THE SUDDEN DEATH OF IN Loco PARENTIS?
By the second half of the twentieth century, many courts acknowl-
edged that the in loco parentis doctrine no longer provided a satisfac-
tory solution to student-university disputes. The influx of older
students, the lowering of the age of majority, and changing social condi-
tions made the common-law approach untenable at most institutions.
Courts experimented with a variety of approaches designed to recognize
the fundamental changes in American education. In particular, courts
increasingly used contract law to treat the student-university relation-
ship as not entirely one-sided.103 If disciplinary rules held a student to
certain standards of conduct, then the educational institution recipro-
cally could be bound by its own representations. In addition, several
crucial decisions recognized that students and teachers enjoy certain
constitutional rights.10 4
A. Contract Comes to Campus
Contract law has been applied to student-university disputes for
many years,0 5 and recent litigants have relied on contract doctrine with
increasing frequency.0 6 Although the first American courts to address
the contract theory typically found for the university defendant, their
101. See, e.g., Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913).
102. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
103. See infra subpart IV(A).
104. In the words of the Supreme Court, "students or teachers [do not] shed their constitu-
tional rights ... at the schoolhouse gate." Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(ruling that a high school could not prohibit the wearing of arm bands protesting the Vietnam
War). See also infra subpart IV(B).
105. See, e.g., Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 21 Ohio C.C. 144, 155 (1901) (holding that a
student contracts to submit to reasonable discipline while university promises not to "impose on
him penalties which he in no wise merits"). Cases invoking in loco parentis often referred to the
contractual nature of the student-university relationship as well. See supra note 93 and accompa-
nying text. In these cases, however, the courts treated the "contract" as one-sided.
106. See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975); Carr v. St. John's
Univ., 17 A.D.2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, affd mem., 12 N.Y.2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d
834 (1962).
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recognition of mutual contractual obligations was promising. One of the
earliest cases, Anthony v. Syracuse University,107 involved a student
who was dismissed for failing to be "a typical Syracuse girl." Although
the court rejected her claim, the opinion acknowledged that the rules of
contract largely define the student-university relationship. 08 The court
determined that the school's good-conduct regulations were analogous
to a termination-at-will clause in an employment contract.10 9 The
Anthony decision was broadened by subsequent rulings that found im-
plied contractual duties in the student-university relationship"10 and
held that the contractual terms could be defined by the contents of the
school's official publications."' A student's dismissal motivated by bad
faith, capriciousness, or arbitrariness could be challenged as a violation
of the school's contractual obligation to deal fairly with its students." 2
The application of contract law to student-university disputes thus
seemed promising for student litigants. As courts displayed a greater
willingness to use contract law as a tool to promote fairness and good
faith performance, many hoped that student rights would undergo a
similar expansion."" If the student-university relationship could be de-
fined primarily in terms of written and implied agreements, the all-en-
compassing authority schools enjoyed under the in loco parentis
doctrine would be limited severely.""
B. The Constitution and the Colleges
1. Dixon v. Alabama
The Fifth Circuit's landmark decision in Dixon v. Alabama"5
seemed to sound the death knell for the in loco parentis doctrine at
public universities."1e In Dixon six black students were expelled from an
Alabama state college presumably because of their participation in civil
rights demonstrations. 1 7 The students claimed that the United States
107. 224 A.D. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928).
108. Id. at 490-91, 231 N.Y.S. at 439.
109. Id. at 491, 231 N.Y.S. at 440.
110. See Carr, 17 A.D.2d at 633, 231 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
111. See University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
112. Connelly v. University of Vt. & State Agric. College, 244 F. Supp. 156, 159 (D. Vt. 1965).
See also Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 15 Cal. App. 3d 823, 93 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1971).
113. See infra note 140.
114. In response to claims that such enforcement would constitute undue interference, one
commentator argued that "courts would no more than hold institutions of higher education to
their voluntary promises, a practice as appropriate to the courts as it is fair to students and col-
leges alike." Note, Toward Contractual Rights, supra note 10, at 189.
115. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
116. See Van Alstyne, supra note 62, at 412 (calling Dixon a "watershed" decision).
117. 294 F.2d at 151, 152 n.3.
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Constitution" 8 required procedural due process in the form of notice
and an opportunity to be heard before they were expelled from the
state-supported institution."-9 The Fifth Circuit agreed and explicitly
rejected the district court's assertion 20 that because the Constitution
does not guarantee a citizen the right to attend a state-supported edu-
cational institution, school administrators may violate the constitu-
tional rights of students with impunity.'2 ' The court noted that public
universities are instruments of the state for purposes of due process and
therefore they could not employ disciplinary regulations to curtail stu-
dents' constitutional rights.'2 2 The Dixon court rejected the notion that
traditional judicial deference to university discipline decisions should
control the outcome of the case. 23 The state, operating as an institution
of higher learning, may not infringe on the constitutional rights of stu-
dents simply because they are students.22 This potentially revolution-
ary principle marked the beginning of a new era in student-university
law. 25
2. Beyond Dixon
In addition to the procedural due process rights ensured by Dixon
and its progeny, 21 public colleges and universities now are prohibited
from infringing on students' First Amendment rights of free speech and
association, 12 7 and their Fourth Amendment protections against unrea-
118. The student litigants based their arguments on the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 151 n.1.
119. Id.
120. See Dixon v. Alabama, 186 F. Supp. 945, 950 (M.D. Ala. 1960).
121. 294 F.2d at 156. The court quoted the well-known dictum of the Supreme Court that
"[o]ne may not have a constitutional right to go to Bagdad, but the Government may not prohibit
one from going there unless by means consonant with due process of law." Id. (quoting Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961)). Previous case law supported the idea that a state-
supported education was a privilege. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245,
261-62 (1934) (holding that conscientious objectors could be required to take a military training
course).
122. Dixon, 294 F.2d at 156. See also infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
123. 294 F.2d at 157-58.
124. See id. at 158.
125. See Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1030-32 (1969)
(explaining the revolutionary nature of Dixon).
126. See Greenhill v. Bailey, 519 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1975); Nash v. Auburn Univ., 621 F. Supp.
948 (M.D. Ala. 1985); Stoller v. College of Medicine, 562 F. Supp. 403 (M.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 727
F.2d 1101 (3d Cir. 1984); Hall v. University of Minn., 530 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn. 1982); Soglin v.
Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Woody v. Burns, 188 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1966).
127. See Widemar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Fox
v. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y., 841 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1988); Students Against
Apartheid Coalition v. O'Neil, 838 F.2d 735 (4th Cir. 1988); Gay Student Services v. Texas A & M
Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984); University of Miss. Chapter of Miss. Civil Liberties Union v.
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sonable search and seizure. 128 Post-Dixon constitutional decisions dealt
in loco parentis a nearly fatal blow at public institutions of higher
learning. The courts no longer justified egregious constitutional viola-
tions by reference to the paternalistic authority of school officials to
discipline students. Not surprisingly, many commentators heralded a
new era in student-university law after the Dixon decision. 29 The ex-
tension of constitutional rights to public university students appeared
to mark the end of extreme judicial deference to institutional discipli-
nary authority.
V. IN Loco PARENTIS. GONE BUT NOT FORGOTTEN
Despite these developments in contract and constitutional law, sig-
nificant barriers continue to impede student litigants in American
courts. When a student sues on the basis of contractual theories, courts
may apply exceptionally harsh rules of construction. Unusual judicial
deference replaces widely accepted commercial contract doctrine. 30 Al-
though the Constitution offers a promising legal opportunity for some
students, the state action doctrine severely limits its applicability.''
What is more disturbing is that universities are reluctant to abandon
their traditional control, as the hate speech controversy demon-
strates. 3'2 However disguised and reformed, in loco parentis survives.
A. Judicial Hostility to Student Claims
1. The Strange Rules of Contract
While courts have recognized that the laws of contract may define
the student-university relationship, they have avoided applying ordi-
nary commercial contract doctrine, especially in the private university
context. 38 In many cases, the court acknowledges the contractual na-
University of Miss., 452 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1971); Gay Liberation v. Univ. of Mo., 558 F.2d 848 (8th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1080 (1978); Gay Students Org. of Univ. of N.H. v. Bonner, 509
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974); Jones v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Arizona, 436 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.
1970); Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
128. See Piazzalo v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971) (involving a private university);
Morale v. Grigel, 442 F. Supp. 988 (D.N.H. 1976).
129. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 62; Wright, supra note 125. Not surprisingly, this new
era coincided with the lowering of the age of majority from 21 to 18 in most jurisdictions. At least
theoretically, the in loco parentis theory always had been based on the delegation of authority to
the school by the natural parent.
130. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
131. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
132. See infra subpart V(B).
133. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 898 (1975); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1976); Giles v. Howard Univ., 428
F. Supp. 603 (D.D.C. 1977). Since private colleges and universities are not subject to constitutional
claims because they are not state actors, a suit in contract often is the only possibility for an
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ture of the student-university relationship, but proceeds to resurrect
thoroughly discredited contract law to construe the agreement against
the student. T'3 Almost without exception, courts apply exceptionally
harsh standards to student litigants. 35 The courts typically hold that
contract law should not be rigidly applied, even though the student-
university relationship is contractual in nature. 36 Courts also justify
the stricter standard by declaring that the student-university relation-
ship is unique.13 7 Such statements are not particularly helpful, however,
since any business is in some sense unique when compared with other
businesses. Nevertheless, courts seem to imply that some particular,
unidentifiable characteristic of higher education makes commercial con-
tract doctrine inappropriate.
Not all courts employ this inarticulate rationale to deny student
contract claims. A handful of judges have been less reluctant to apply
ordinary commercial contract doctrine to student-university disputes.
For example, in the unreported case of Lowenthal v. Vanderbilt Uni-
versity, 3 8 the court rejected assertions that the special nature of uni-
aggrieved student.
134. See infra note 136. See also Note, Toward Contractual Rights, supra note 10, at 170
(stating that "student and school were scarcely the conventional equal partners of commercial
contract law"). One commentator has observed the inherent unfairness in many student-university
contracts:
The rules which a student "contracts" to observe are altogether nonnegotiable. . . .The
majority of "sellers" uniformly employ a self-serving clause reserving the right to terminate
the relation at will according to standards they unilaterally determine pursuant to a vague
"good conduct" rule. Thus, the nonnegotiability of terms is compounded by the real lack of
shopping alternatives, the inequality of the parties in fixing terms, parallel practices among
sellers, and the impotency of individual applicants to affect terms.
Van Alstyne, supra note 10, at 584 n.1. While not all student-university situations are so drasti-
cally one-sided, enough conform to Van Alstyne's model to raise questions about the courts' seri-
ousness in implementing contract doctrine.
135. This harsh treatment of student claims is particularly surprising in light of the general
trend of contract law in this area. Most modem courts interpret vague rules against the drafter
and have not hesitated to void unconscionable provisions. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
136. See, e.g., Slaughter, 514 F.2d at 626. One court, for example, found that a university
could modify contractual provisions at will in order "to properly exercise its educational responsi-
bility." Mahavongsanan, 529 F.2d at 450.
137. Slaughter, 514 F.2d at 626; Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1062 (N.D. Ga.
1977). Often judges also will mention a concern about the institutional competence of the judiciary
to make "academic" decisions. This rationale seems somewhat disingenuous given the courts' usual
willingness to make decisions regarding almost any other enterprise.
138. No. 8-8525, Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee (Aug. 15, 1977), reprinted
in J. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 430, 432 (1979). The case involved a
graduate program that was inadequately funded and supported by the university. The Lowenthal
court observed that "[w]hile the student-university relationship is indeed unique, it does not vest a
university with unlimited power to do as it pleases without facing the consequences." The court
also noted: "[Sihould this court ignore the obvious failure of Vanderbilt to live up to its contrac-
tual obligations to these students, it would be a signal to Vanderbilt and other institutions that
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versities made them immune to ordinary contract principles. The court
also dismissed Vanderbilt's argument that a ruling for the plaintiff
would have "dire consequences" for higher education. 139
The use of contract law in student-university disputes was promis-
ing to the student litigant laboring under the in loco parentis doctrine.
As commercial contract law became more concerned with actual bar-
gains and more sensitive to signs of unfair advantage, many believed
that the student plaintiff's position would be strengthened.14 0 Courts,
however, have been reluctant to apply accepted commercial contract
doctrines to student-university disputes. By focusing on the unique
characteristics of educational institutions, courts avoid confronting the
evolution of most American schools from intimate colleges to massive
multiversities.
Courts must take a long, hard look at modern education to decide
if it remains entitled to this extraordinary deference. Undoubtedly, ed-
ucation serves an important role in American society. But the courts
have yet to explain convincingly why this justifies a unique and pecu-
liarly harsh application of contract law. When many modern universi-
ties rival large corporations in their numbers of customers, employees,
and size, it is unfair for them to remain immune from basic commercial
contract principles.14 '
2. Limitations on Constitutional Claims
Dixon v. Alabama14 2 often is hailed as a pivotal rejection of the in
loco parentis doctrine.'M But despite the Dixon decision, thousands of
students at private universities remain outside the scope of constitu-
tional protection.'4 Since the Dartmouth College case' 4" recognized the
independent nature of private education in the United States, the
they are immune from the same legal obligations which govern other relationships in our society."
Id.
139. See id.
140. See generally Note, Toward Contractual Rights, supra note 10, at 167.
141. The schools themselves have contributed to the commercialization of education by an
increasing involvement in nonacademic enterprises, such as retirement homes, vacation homes, and
real estate development. See Berg, Academic Capitalism Helps Make Ends Meet, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 5, 1986, at 39, col. 1.
142. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
143. See supra subpart IV(B)(1).
144. See generally Silets, Of Students' Rights and Honor: The Application of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Strictures to Honor Code Proceedings at Private Colleges and
Universities, 64 DEN. U.L. REv. 47 (1987); Comment, An Overview: The Private University and
Due Process, 1970 DuKE L.J. 795; Annotation, Action of Private Institution of Higher Education
as Constituting State Action, or Action Under Color of Law, for Purposes of Fourteenth Amend-
ment and 42 USCS § 1983, 37 A.L.R. FED. 601 (1978).
145. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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courts have been nearly unanimous in holding that private colleges and
universities are not instruments of the state.4 6 As a result, actions by
these schools cannot be attributed to the state for constitutional pur-
poses.147 The Dixon decision thus left untouched thousands of students
attending private colleges and universities. These students have no sub-
stantive or procedural constitutional safeguards.
A number of writers have questioned this bright-line distinction
between the public and private contexts. 48 They have advanced several
justifications for recognizing certain universities as instruments of the
state.149 The courts, however, have been unwilling to extend constitu-
tional protections to students attending these private universities. In
Blackburn v. Fisk University, 50 for example, a student argued that the
university should be treated as an arm of the state since it exhibited
many of the characteristics of a municipality. 15 The student noted that
the university provided municipal services, including health and sanita-
tion services, a police force, roads, and public housing. 52 The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, followed other courts 5 3 in finding these governmental
functions to be insufficient to qualify as state action.154 Likewise, courts
have been unsympathetic to claims that the inherent importance of the
educational enterprise constitutes a sufficient "public function"'15 to
satisfy the state action doctrine. 56
The courts' reluctance to extend constitutional protections to uni-
146. See Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969); People v. Boettner, 80 Misc. 2d 3,
362 N.Y.S.2d 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
147. When the government is significantly involved in the affairs of a private organization,
the organization is subject to constitutional restrictions. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715, 725 (1961). State action exists when there is a "sufficiently close nexus between the State
and the challenged action." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
148. See, e.g., Silets, supra note 144, at 57; McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DEN.
L.J. 558, 560 (1968); Goldman, The University and the Liberty of its Students-A Fiduciary The-
ory, 54 Ky. L.J. 643, 650 (1966); Comment, Common Law Rights for Private University Students:
Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALE L.J. 120, 122-23 (1974).
149. For example, one commentator argues that increasing federal financial involvement in
private education rises to the level of state action. See Cohen, The Private-Public Legal Aspects of
Institutions of Higher Education, 45 DEN. L.J. 643, 646-47 (1968).
150. 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971).
151. Id. at 122-23.
152. Id. at 123.
153. See, e.g., Browns v. Mitchell, 409 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1969).
154. Fisk, 443 F.2d at 124.
155. Under this analysis, an enterprise may be considered state action when the function
performed is one that is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State." Jackson, 419 U.S. at
353.
156. See Krohn v. Harvard Law School, 552 F.2d 21, 24 (1st Cir. 1977); Powe v. Miles, 407
F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968); Counts v. Voorhees College, 312 F. Supp. 598, 606 (D.S.C. 1970). See
generally Annotation, supra note 144. But see Belk v. Chancellor of Wash. Univ., 336 F. Supp. 45,
48 (E.D. Mo. 1970) (finding education to be a public function).
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versity students is unfortunate. Contrary to the Fisk ruling, many mul-
tiversities are in fact small cities. The university police may be the only
law enforcement officers students encounter. Courts should give serious
consideration to the practical effects of the modern university's size and
complexity. While it may not be possible to apply constitutional limita-
tions to private universities without seriously undermining the state ac-
tion doctrine, the idea should be considered carefully.
B. Assault from Within: Hate Speech Rules
The lingering attraction of in loco parentis has not been confined
to the courts. Universities and colleges experienced the same inability
to accept the changed nature of American education. This reluctance to
abandon in loco parentis is seen in the recent debate over college hate
speech rules. 157 These rules were designed as a response to the reports
of increased hostility toward minorities on campuses during the
1980s. s5 s To discourage such incidents of harassment, several colleges
and universities adopted disciplinary provisions as a means of punish-
ing offenders. 159
157. For a useful and thorough discussion of the various legal issues associated with the hate
speech controversy, see Note, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of
Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351 (1990) [hereinafter Note, Clos-
ing the Campus Gates]. See generally Hechinger, On Campus, and Elsewhere, Should Free
Speech Include Harsh Words?, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1990, at B7, col. 1; Taylor, Fending Off
"Fighting Words," Legal Times, Jan. 1, 1990, at 19, col. 2.
158. Incidents of minority harassment have been reported on at least 170 campuses. See
Bayh, Let's Tear Off Their Hoods, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 17, 1989, at 8. These attacks have been di-
rected at racial minorities, women, and homosexuals, and sometimes involved physical violence.
See Note, Student Discriminatory Harassment, 16 J.C. & U.L. 311, 311-13 (1989). But see Leo,
Racism on American College Campuses, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 8, 1990, at 53 (arguing
that isolated racist incidents are not truly representative of a widespread problem). Some commen-
tators have argued that any increase in racism may be a result of minority favoritism. See D'Souza,
Sins of Admission, NEW REPUBLIc, Feb. 18, 1991, at 30, 33 (arguing that "many white students
who are generally sympathetic to the minority cause become ... irritated by the extent of prefer-
ential treatment and double standards").
159. As many as 117 institutions have adopted some form of hate speech regulation. Post,
Free Speech and Religious, Racial and Sexual Harassment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 267 (1991).
The institutions include: the University of California, Emory University, Smith College, Stanford
University, the University of Vermont, the University of Massachusetts, the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, and the University of Wisconsin. Note, supra note 158, at 1375-76 n.137.
Administrators at Notre Dame University hoped to complete the formulation of a policy by the
end of the 1990-91 academic year. See Minority Students Present Demands, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1991, at B4, col. 1. Vanderbilt University also was preparing a racial speech policy. See Issue of
Restricting Some Speech to be Debated at Vanderbilt Forum, Nashville Banner, Dec. 1, 1990, at
B-3, col. 3. The Board of Regents of the University of Tennessee adopted a minority harassment
policy in March 1991. See New College Rule on Slurs Incites Free Speech Debate, The Tennes-
sean, Mar. 17, 1991, at 3-B, col. 1.
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching estimates that 70% of colleges
and universities have adopted some form of a hate speech code. Innerst, 'Political Correctness'
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The University of Michigan adopted perhaps the broadest anti-
harassment policy in 1988.160 The policy established three levels of reg-
ulation based on the location of the speech"'1 or type of behavior.162
The regulations prohibited behavior that "stigmatizes or victimizes an
individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or
Vietnam-era veteran status" when such behavior might interfere with
educational pursuits.6 3 Students who violated the policy could be pun-
ished by penalties ranging from formal reprimand to expulsion.16' The
Bashed From Right, Left, Washington Times, Mar. 13, 1991, at Al. Harvard University, however,
has explicitly refused to implement a hate speech policy after a controversy involving a student's
display of the Confederate flag.
160. The policy is reprinted in Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich.
1989). The administration created the regulations after what appeared to be an increase in racist
incidents on campus. The incidents included racially discriminatory remarks on the student radio
station and the distribution by an anonymous person of a flier that called for "open season" on
"saucer lips, porch monkeys, and jigaboos." Id. at 854. The acting university president declared
that such incidents were seriously offensive to members of the community and detracted from the
school's educational climate. Id. at 855. The acting president acknowledged the potential First
Amendment problems with the regulations, but somewhat circuitously reasoned that
just as an individual cannot shout "Fire!" in a crowded theater and then claim immunity from
prosecution. . ., so a great many American universities have taken the position that students
at a university cannot by speaking or writing discriminatory remarks which seriously offend
many individuals beyond the immediate victim, and which, therefore detract from the neces-
sary educational climate of a campus, claim immunity from a campus disciplinary proceeding.
I believe that position to be valid.
Id.
A civil libertarian might respond with the observation of Judge Learned Hand that the First
Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many, this is, and always will be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943). Hate speech rules represent precisely the sort of authoritative determination of
acceptable speech that Judge Hand warned against. Many university administrators have decided
that what they personally consider to be racist speech should not be spoken. This understanding
runs directly counter to the idea of free speech as a competitive marketplace of ideas. When com-
munity leaders begin distinguishing between right and wrong speech, the potential for abuse is
evident. But see Wiener, Words That Wound: Free Speech for Campus Bigots?, THE NATION, Feb.
26, 1990, at 272.
161. Certain public areas and student publications were exempt from the regulations, which
applied mainly to classrooms, libraries, and other academic areas. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 856.
162. Id.
163. Id. For a representative sampling of other hate speech regulations, see REGULATING RA-
ciAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS: A LEGAL COMPENDIUM (T. Hustoles & W. Connolly, Jr. eds. 1990).
164. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 857. Expulsion was reserved for "violent or dangerous acts, re-
peated offenses, or a willful failure to comply with a lesser sanction." Id. At least one student at an
American college has been expelled for violation of a hate speech policy. In 1991 Brown University
expelled a student who was found guilty of violating a policy prohibiting students from subjecting
"another person, group or class of persons to inappropriate, abusive, threatening or demeaning
actions based on race, religion, gender, handicap, ethnicity, national origin or sexual orientation."
Student at Brown is Expelled Under a Rule Barring 'Hate Speech,' N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1991, at
A13, col. 1. The school determined that the student shouted the word "nigger" in the courtyard of
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university's interpretive guide to the policy indicated that derogatory
comments about a person's physical appearance or a statement assert-
ing men's superiority to women in a particular field might violate the
regulations.166
The University of Michigan disciplined or threatened to discipline
at least three students for classroom comments that allegedly violated
the policy.166 One student was formally charged for stating that he be-
lieved homosexuality to be a treatable disease.1 7 Another student who
felt threatened by the regulations filed suit challenging their constitu-
tionality."" In Doe v. University of Michigan"6 9 the court found the
policy to be an unconstitutional infringement on student rights.17 0 The
Doe court did not address specifically the special problems created by
the student-university relationship in its examination of the policy. But
the court forcefully reiterated the message of Dixon v. Alabama:'7' A
public university has no greater ability to infringe on citizens' rights
than any other government agency.1 2 Doe v. University of Michigan is
an important reaffirmation of the Dixon doctrine guaranteeing constitu-
tional protections to university students.
Despite the Doe ruling, many universities continue to discourage
racist speech through restrictive regulations. 73 Many public universities
a dormitory and called a particular student a "faggot" and a "Jew". Id. at col. 3. The President of
Brown, Vartan Gregorian, stated that "[i]t is my intention to prosecute vigorously, and to expel
immediately, such individual or individuals for any attempt to inject and promote racism and thus
insult the dignity of our students as citizens of Brown." Id. at col. 4.
165. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 857-58. According to the publication, hosting a party and inviting
everyone except a suspected lesbian could be actionable. Id. at 858. A similarly broad policy was
enacted by the University of California-Berkeley. Curtis, Racial, Ethnic Slurs Banned on UC
Campus, San Francisco Chron., Sept. 27, 1989, at Al, col. 3. The rules prohibited abusive language
demeaning a student's "race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability, and other per-
sonal characteristics." Id. (emphasis added).
166. Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 861.
167. Id. In another incident, authorities charged a student with a violation of the policy for
allegedly reciting a "homophobic" limerick in a public speaking class. Id. at 865. The charges were
dropped when the student was persuaded to attend a "gay rap" session and apologize. Id.
168. Id. at 858. The plaintiff, a psychology graduate student, asserted that the rules chilled
his right to discuss controversial theories which might be deemed racist. Id.
169. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
170. The court found the policy to be overbroad, both facially and in application, and so
vague as to violate due process. Id. at 866-67.
171. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961). See supra subpart IV(B)(1).
172. Judge Cohn noted that "[w]hile the Court is sympathetic to the University's obligation
to ensure equal educational opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not be at the
expense of free speech." Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 868. After the rules were invalidated, the university
extensively revised its policy. See DePalma, Battling Bias, Campuses Face Free Speech Fight,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at B10, cols. 1, 2. Under the new code, almost 20 complaints were filed
during the period from September 1990 to February 1991. Id. at col. 2.
173. In fact, some commentators have argued that the disputed speech regulations do not go
far enough and suggest that in an ideal world unfettered by constitutional restraints, it would be
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1135
responded to the decision by enacting less restrictive rules aimed at
banning only "fighting words." 174 These rules are based on United
States Supreme Court decisions holding that certain types of face-to-
face speech designed to inflict injury or which tend to provoke an im-
mediate hostile response are not protected by the First Amendment. 175
Some private universities have also opted for a fighting words approach
and punish speech only when it is addressed to an individual or small
group.'76 This narrower class of rules has not been challenged in the
courts. As more colleges and universities implement racist speech poli-
cies, however, the debate over their wisdom promises to continue.
Commentators ranging from civil libertarians'" to political con-
desirable to regulate, for example, the "common and potentially devastating" effect of a professor's
inattentive posture when a female student speaks in class. Bartlett & O'Barr, The Chilly Climate
on College Campuses: An Expansion of the "Hate Speech" Debate, 1990 DUKE L.J. 574, 575.
174. See, e.g., Note, supra note 157, at 1376 n.137 (observing that the University of Connect-
icut at Storrs adopted a fighting words approach). But see Hodulik, Prohibiting Discriminatory
Harassment by Regulating Student Speech: A Balance of First Amendment and University In-
terests, 16 J.C. & U.L. 573, 576 (1990) (noting that the University of Wisconsin adopted a code
similar to Michigan's). Although some private schools have opted for more restrictive regulations,
they might do well to heed the warning of Professor Wright: "[I]t seems to me unthinkable that
... any private institution would consider recognizing fewer rights in their students than the min-
imum the Constitution exacts of the state universities, or that their students would long remain
quiescent if a private college were to embark on such a benighted course." Wright, supra note 125,
at 1036.
175. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Subsequent Court deci-
sions have so limited the Chaplinsky doctrine that it is questionable whether it supports most
racist speech rules. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (requiring that punisha-
ble fighting words be directed at a particular person and that violence be imminent). See generally
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-18 (2d ed. 1988).
176. Stanford University has taken this approach. See, e.g., STANFORD UNIVERSITY, FUNDA-
MENTAL STANDARD INTERPRETATION: FREE ExPRESSION AND DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT (June
1990), reprinted in relevant part in Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest
Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 524. In March 1991 Republican Congressman Henry J. Hyde of
Illinois introduced legislation to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Bill Would Widen As-
saults on Campus Speech Codes, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1991, at B7, col. 1. The amendment would
allow students at nonreligious private schools receiving federal aid to challenge disciplinary actions
related to speech. Id.
177. After much debate, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) officially condemned
hate speech rules in October 1990. See Still Freer Speech, ECONOMIST, Feb. 2, 1991, at 26, col. 1.
The ACLU policy statement on the issue declares that "[a]ll members of the academic community
have the right to hold and to express views that others may find repugnant, offensive, or emotion-
ally distressing." ACLU Policy Statement: Free Speech and Bias on College Campuses, reprinted
in Strossen, supra note 176, at 571. For a civil libertarian's extensive and persuasive critique of
hate speech regulations, see Strossen, supra note 176, at 493-94 (arguing that "equality will be
served most effectively by continuing to apply traditional, speech-protective precepts to racist
speech"). But see Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85
Nw. U.L. REV. 343, 387 (1991) (arguing that racist speech "crushes the spirits of its victims while
creating culture at odds with our national values"); Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulat-
ing Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 437 (asserting that rules promote "important
values expressed elsewhere in the Constitution"). The obvious problem with Professor Delgado's
argument is that it presupposes a definitive and mandatory understanding of "our" values.
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servatives 17 8 have criticized hate speech rules as an attempt to limit the
free exchange of ideas in the name of "political correctness. ' 17 9 Clearly,
hate speech rules represent a revival of the in loco parentis concept.
The arguments used to justify the hate speech rules are remarkably
similar to those used by early courts to invoke the in loco parentis doc-
trine.180 Advocates of campus speech regulations promote an under-
standing of the university as an insular and ideal world interested
primarily in promoting substantive moral values different from those of
society as a whole.""1 While perhaps accurate at the small liberal arts
colleges, this view represents an understanding closer to eighteenth cen-
tury educational philosophy than the twentieth century multiversity. 82
These modern multiversities are far too large, impersonal, bureaucratic,
and diverse to serve as laboratories for the creation of a utopian nondis-
criminatory world.I s' Proponents of hate speech rules seem to advocate
the replacement of the earlier Christian orthodoxy with a new ortho-
doxy based on the promotion of diversity. 84 This approach creates seri-
178. See, e.g., Sensitivity Facism, NAT'L REV., Nov. 10 1989, at 19; Washburn, Liberalism
Versus Free Speech, NAT'L REV., Sept. 30, 1988, at 39.
179. This phenomenon has been described as "a large body of belief in academia and else-
where that a cluster of opinions about race, ecology, feminism, culture and foreign policy defines a
kind of 'correct' attitude toward the problems of the world, a sort of unofficial ideology of the
university." Bernstein, The Rising Hegemony of the Politically Correct, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1990,
at X-1, col. 1. See also Cermele, The Political Seduction of the University, CAMPUS, Winter 1991,
at 3, col. 1; Mooney, Scholars Decry Campus Hostility to Western Culture at a Time When More
Nations Embrace its Values, Chron. Higher Educ., Jan. 30, 1991, at A15, col. 2 (noting concern
that "U.S. academics increasingly face restraints. . . aimed at curbing language found offensive by
some colleagues and students").
180. See, e.g., Hodulik, supra note 174, at 576 (arguing that "[1]egal and policy principles
establish the University's duty to provide equal access to education, to prevent interference with
educational opportunities, and to regulate student conduct"). The Supreme Court has invoked in
loco parentis to suppress offensive speech by high school students. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986).
181. This moral ideal is expressed in different terms at every school. At Marquette, for exam-
ple, the defining term is "human dignity." At Mount Holyoke, the ideal is "diversity." Post, supra
note 159, at 275-77.
182. "Drawing on the Carnegie Foundation's call for a more 'caring' campus, and led by col-
lege presidents with 'helping professionals' in tow, administrators are now redefining the purpose
of higher education. Some colleges have in effect reverted to their earlier roles as religious/confes-
sional institutions." Siegal, The Cult of Multiculturalism, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 34, 36.
See also D'Souza, Illiberal Education, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1991, at 51, 54 (stating that "[t]he
quest for 'diversity' . risks its own paradoxical forms of closure and parochialism").
183. See Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 211, 260 (1991) (noting that "any wide-ranging claim that public colleges and
universities should be able to inculcate values through disciplinary measures misstates the[ir]
proper role"). But see Krasnow v. Virginia Polytech. Inst. & State Univ., 414 F. Supp. 55, 57 (W.D.
Va. 1976) (asserting that public colleges may require "superior moral standards, which may be set
by the institution") (citing Papish v. Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 331 F. Supp. 1321, 1333
(W.D. Mo. 1971), aff'd, 464 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1972)).
184. According to Dinesh D'Souza, "'[d]iversity' no longer refers to a range of views on a
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ous tensions within the university community. Faculty and students are
fearful of speaking freely lest they be branded racist, sexist, or "Viet-
nam-era-status-phobic. 18 5
Ironically, many of the faculty and administrators who support re-
strictions on free speech were students themselves during the Free
Speech Movement of the 1960s. 86 Once protesters against conventional
campus orthodoxy and outdated disciplinary rules, they now seek to
reshape the university in the name of their own orthodoxy. Both the
continuing judicial hostility to student claims and the hate speech con-
troversy demonstrate that in loco parentis lives, both in the courts and
within the educational establishment.
VI. MAKING SENSE OF THE STUDENT-UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP: A
PROPOSED SOLUTION
Student-university legal doctrine remains confused and frustrat-
ingly myopic. Although most courts have recognized the inherent inade-
quacies of the in loco parentis doctrine, many are unwilling to abandon
their traditional deference to the decisions of academic institutions.
The consequence of these conflicting impulses is a hodgepodge of liberal
theories and harsh results. Courts feel that the sanctity of academia
and the uniqueness of the educational enterprise demand deference and
nonintervention in some instances. At the same time, they are at least
vaguely aware that the nature of American higher education has
changed significantly.
The challenge for the judiciary is to develop a flexible, but doctri-
nally consistent approach to student-university disputes.' 8 A solution
disputed question but rather entails enlisting in a whole set of ideological causes that are identified
as being 'for diversity.'" D'Souza, supra note 182, at 55. Faculty members often are explicit about
their ideological objectives. See id. at 57 (quoting a dean as saying "I see my scholarship as an
extension of my political activism"). Student activists have made clear their opinion that diversity
does not include the right of others to express inappropriate attitudes toward minorities. In the
words of one student at the University of Massachusetts, "[w]e'll do anything we need to be able
to live our lives free of harassment and with dignity." Gay Groups Drown Out Rally by Conserva-
tives, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1991, at B4, col 1. See also Blow, Mea Culpa, NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 18,
1991, at 32 (asserting that "[t]heir idea of diversity is a chorus of voices all saying the same
thing").
185. See Universities: Take Care, ECONOMIST, Feb. 10, 1990, at 20 (observing that
"[t]eachers as well as students must weigh their words"). The racial hypersensitivity resulting from
the quest for diversity occasionally borders on the absurd. At Harvard, for example, dining-hall
workers were charged with racial insensitivity for planning a "Back to the Fifties" party. Id. Ap-
parently, nostalgia for that period was unacceptable since it was a time of segregation. Id.
186. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
187. Several commentators have acknowledged the need for "a more flexible judicial ap-
proach to these conflicts,. . . one based on the nature of the relationship between the student and
the school." Note, Toward Contractual Rights, supra note 10, at 164; see also Fowler, supra note
81, at 416 (arguing for a fiduciary theory since previous approaches "have not served to clearly
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is possible only if courts are willing to acknowledge the differences be-
tween traditional colleges and the modern multiversity. The history of
American higher education reflects the transformation of colleges into
universities, a distinction crucial to any coherent adjudication of stu-
dent-university disputes. Colleges and universities differ substantially
in philosophy and structure and should not be evaluated by the same
legal standard.188 The most important issue is not whether a school is
public or private, but whether it is a college or a university. Courts
must recognize that every American school has chosen one of these two
competing models. This choice should affect the standard applied to
student-university disputes.
Much of the reluctance of courts to interfere in campus affairs
stems from an unrealistic view of modern education. Perhaps judges,
remembering fondly their own college days, resist intervening in the
sacrosanct world of their youth. Most American schools, however, long
ago abandoned the collegiate model that once justified the policy of
nonintervention. The rhetoric of community has been overwhelmed by
the mass of students, teachers, and employees. Many schools now re-
semble small cities instead of the intimate and insular collegiate struc-
tures that gave birth to the in loco parentis doctrine. Their legal status
should reflect this expansion and change in philosophy. On the other
hand, those schools that have chosen to remain colleges or which pro-
mote explicit religious values should be treated deferentially by the
courts. The two different models of higher education should be consid-
ered first in the resolution of any student-university dispute.
A. The Courts and the Multiversity
The majority of American students attend large universities1 8
modeled after the German ideal. 90 A large number of these students
define the relationship between the institution and the student"). One writer has proposed a "uni-
tary theory" designed to promote substantial justice for both the student and the university.
Michael, The Unitary Theory: A Proposal for a Stable Student-School Legal Relationship, 1 J.L.
& EDuc. 411 (1972). This approach would emphasize the fundamental goals of the school and the
student. Michael's proposal seems too vague, however, to be helpful to the courts.
188. See Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir. 1975) (stating that
the student-university relationship may "be different at different schools"); Michael, supra note
187, at 427 (noting that courts must consider the type of institution involved); Note, Toward Con-
tractual Rights, supra note 10, at 187 (arguing that "the model of higher education protected by
the courts may bear little resemblance to the diversity of educational experiences").
189. In 1985, 38% of American institutions consisted of fewer than 1000 students. These
institutions enrolled less than 5% of the total national student populations. In the same year, 50%
of students attended institutions with more than 10,000 students. OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RE-
SEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, EDUCATION INDICATORS 116 (1988).
190. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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are past the age of majority919 and live in nonuniversity housing. For
many students, education has become primarily an economic transac-
tion and a means to professional success. 9" At the same time, their
schools consciously have rejected the English collegiate model of educa-
tion in favor of the grander European university design. The intimacy
and insularity that justified the in loco parentis doctrine has been lost
in the rush to expand. Schools founded as intimate colleges have be-
come, in effect, small cities. The modern multiversity bears little resem-
blance to the nineteenth century college.
For this reason, in loco parentis should not affect either the legal
disputes or the internal philosophies of these multiversities. By pur-
posefully pursuing university status, most American institutions have
forfeited their right to the legal deference granted them by the English
common law. Contract law should be used rigorously and consistently
to ameliorate the effects of students' poor bargaining position. Courts
should give serious consideration to enforcing constitutional rights at
both public and private multiversities. Courts should not allow vestiges
of in loco parentis to hinder the fair resolution of student-university
disputes.
In addition, the schools should resist the efforts of those who seek
to give ideological correctness the force of law. Hate speech rules stem
from an understanding of the modern educational system that is simply
contrary to fact. Multiversities long ago abandoned their responsibility
to act as moral guardians of their students. Having made this decision,
they should not attempt to enforce selective moral ideals that reflect a
particular political agenda.'9 3
B. The Collegiate Model
Although multiversities play the leading role in modern American
higher education, a conspicuous minority of schools have chosen a dif-
ferent path. These institutions avoided the rush to Germanize and in-
191. In fact, the number of students of the age of 25 or older has increased steadily in recent
years. In 1972 only 28% of postsecondary students were 25 or older; by 1986 that figure rose to
39%. OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUCATION, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION STATISTICS 116 (1988).
192. See Picozzi v. Sandalow, 623 F. Supp. 1571, 1576 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (stating that
"[e]ducation is the key-or at least the prerequisite-to many successful careers"); Sheler, A New
.Era on Campus, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 16, 1989, at 54 (reporting a consumer fraud suit
filed against a college for failure to provide useful job skills); Wright, supra note 125, at 1032
(stating that a "college education is no longer ... a luxury ... but ... a necessity").
193. Proponents of hate speech rules usually couch their argument in terms of protecting
minority students from pain or injury rather than tempering the moral failures of certain students.
This sort of protection is a quintessentially parental and moralistic function.
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stead focused on educating a small, select group of undergraduates.1 94
In the age of the multiversity, these liberal arts colleges remain bastions
of the collegiate method of education.
The doctrine of in loco parentis still may be applicable in these few
schools.1 95 Courts should not reject summarily the doctrine as an appro-
priate legal model for these institutions. In the context of student-uni-
versity disputes, courts should not equate liberal arts colleges with their
multiversity counterparts. Commercial contract doctrine, for example,
is not particularly relevant to the truly collegiate schools. The mysteri-
ous quality of uniqueness referred to by many courts' has real mean-
ing in the collegiate context. Even hate speech rules may enjoy greater
justification in the collegiate context.19 7 Many of the arguments used to
justify these rules are absurd only when applied to the massive mul-
tiversities that dominate the educational landscape. Courts should hesi-
tate before applying the standards of the commercial market to
student-university relations at liberal arts colleges.
Courts should be able to determine whether an institution involved
in litigation is a true college or a multiversity. Relevant factors include
the history of the school and its statement of its purposes as defined in
official documents. A court should determine if the primary focus is on
undergraduate education or postgraduate and professional programs.
The average age of the students, the percentage of students living on
campus, and the nature of community life outside the classroom are
also factors to be considered. 98 Moreover, a critical factor is whether
the school asserts a parental role in guiding and shaping the moral and
physical well-being of its students as a matter of regular policy. 99 An
194. Others expanded in size, but resisted secularization by retaining explicit religious ties.
See generally G. SCHMIDT, supra note 20.
195. These schools offer students an alternative to the prevailing multiversity approach. Stu-
dents value liberal arts colleges precisely because they are different. William Van Alstyne has
noted the "problematical relevance" of in loco parentis to "the dwindling proportion of small,
residential, private, denominational colleges." Van Alstyne, supra note 62, at 408.
196. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
197. Even in the collegiate context, however, hate speech rules represent a troubling develop-
ment. Civil libertarians such as Strossen, supra note 176, make a persuasive argument that the
best way to discourage racism is through the free exchange of ideas. See also Note, Closing the
Campus Gates, supra note 157, at 1388-89 (stating that a private school adopting hate speech
codes "risks being seen as disingenuous at best, and perhaps even intellectually dishonest").
198. This community life should not be measured simply by counting the number of student
life programs available to students. Rather, the court should consider whether the school's social
insularity is suggestive of the intimacy of a family unit. In other words, do the students and their
teachers work together, live together, and play together?
199. For example, a school that enforces opposite sex visitation rules is very different from
one which pursues a laissez-faire attitude toward students' private lives. The court should be sensi-
tive to inconsistency. Generally, a school should not be permitted to exercise paternal authority in
a selective manner.
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examination of such indicators 00 should make clear whether the school
involved is a college or a multiversity.
When a court determines that the institution involved in a dispute
is in fact a true college, then in loco parentis counsels against undue
interference. This does not mean that the courts must defer to the col-
lege's decision in every case. The courts, however, should respect the
voluntary decision by both parties to enter into a familial community.
By rejecting the Germanization of American education, the twentieth
century college has secured the common-law right to supervise its stu-
dents closely. Likewise, by consciously choosing to attend an intimate
college instead of a multiversity, the student implicitly has agreed to
more extensive control.
Courts should not hesitate to examine the actual nature of the in-
stitution and to use that determination in selecting the appropriate le-
gal standard. Deference may be warranted if the defendant is a true
college. Courts should not allow a desire to protect these institutions to
justify the covert application of in loco parentis to multiversity dis-
putes. The adoption of a two-tiered approach based on the type of
school involved would clarify the situation.
VII. CONCLUSION
American education has changed radically since the founding of the
earliest colleges. The great nineteenth century debate over the German
and English academic ideals ended in the apparent triumph of the uni-
versity model. The courts should recognize these developments and not
allow the vestiges of in loco parentis to obscure the reality of modern
education. Student rights at true universities should be vigorously en-
forced. At the same time, courts should respect the conscious choice of
a minority of institutions to remain residential colleges. At these
schools the traditional deference should be acknowledged and applied.
Only by such an approach will courts do justice to the reality of Ameri-
can education and bring lasting order to this confused but important
area of the law.
Brian Jackson*
200. These factors are only some of the most obvious examples. Perhaps the most important
indicator of all, the size of the institution, would be the easiest to evaluate objectively. While it is
possible for a large institution to operate a true college, in practice such attempts usually have
failed, possibly because of the absence of a truly residential housing system.
* The Author would like to thank Mark C. Henrie, Ph.D. candidate, Harvard University, for
his helpful suggestions and comments about an earlier draft of this Note.
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